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prerogatives. In the same way, the rule governing the descent of lands to co-
parceners was eA"iended to e.xact homage from each coheiress thereby increasing 
the number of the Icing's own tenants. Finally, the law governing the alienation 
of lands held by knight service was applied to socage tenants, too, and this 
device enabled the Icing's agents to uncover numerous "concealed lands" and 
to bring them within prerogative jurisdiction. Their success e."''.-poses the ease 
with which Tudor bureaucrats, once given some authority, were able to catch 
hold of more-especially when Readings at the Inns of Court condoned new-
fangledness in the laws of tenure. 
Professor Thorne's eA-position of Constable's commentary is a masterpiece 
of critical analysis and historical summation. He identifies an hypothetical 
ordinance (one forbidding subinfeudation by tenants in chief without royal 
license which Edward III's pleaders assigned to 1236 or 1246) with a legisla-
tive writ of 1256. This enables him to reconcile, with convincing argument 
and evidence, several fourteeth-century statements that baffied Maitland. Pro-
fessor Thorne's demonstration that Henry VII's administrative policy provoked 
changes in the rules of tenure in capite is a superb example of how re-
course to history, rather than to symbolic logic, can best provide an understand-
ing of how English law was made. His introduction shows tltat Henry VII 
used the common law, as well as conciliar justice, to increase his power, and 
this amplifies the standard e.xplanations of the growth of Tudor monarchy. 
The king' s desire to shrink the swollen purses of landed men doubtless 
prompted a manipulation of old laws; then the Readers at the Inns, with their 
subtle scannings of Prerogativa Regis and the statutes, helped to bring these 
tortuous practices '\vithin the framework of the law." By so doing, they pre-
served the principle that the king should govern according to duly established 
procedures; and so, paradoxically, their Readings played a part in the never-
ending struggle to keep England's law above her ldng. 
'WILLIAM H. DUNHAM, JR. t 
PRICING OF MILITARY PROCUREMENTS. By John Perry Miller. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1949, Pp. "-""• 292. $4.00. 
"TAKE the profit out of war" has long been a crowd-catching slogan. It has 
an understandable appeal. And no one denies tl1at profiteering in time of war 
-whether "hot war" or "cold"-is an unsavory, wasteful and morale-destroy-
ing activity that should be stamped out. But as J olm l\Iiller so persuasively 
argues in this second of the series Studies in Natio11al Policj•, it is both un-
desirable and unrealistic to propose the elimination of all chance for profit in 
war contracts. 
One of the basic tenets of our democracy is that the ma.ximum amount of 
reliance should be placed on private initiative as a means of getting things done. 
t George Burton Adams Professor of History, Yale University. 
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This we achieve mainly by means of a system of competitive free-enterprise. 
We rely, in other words, on the price system to allocate our resources and to 
furnish incentives to efficiency. Admittedly other institutions play a part. 
Admittedly in time of emergency auxiliary controls such as those administered 
in the last war by the OPA and the WPB are necessary to meet the unusual 
stresses of unusual times. But since the price system is the mainspring of our 
economy, and since it effectively furthers our democratic aims of "insuring 
respect for the individual, wide-spread sharing of economic and political power 
and a decentralization of decision making,"1 Miller believes-and I agree with 
him-that every effort should be made to preserve the maximum usc of that 
system in war and crisis as well as in peace. To surrender to the use of comN 
pulsion as a substitute for price incentives would drastically alter our social 
and economic system and seriously jeopardize these democratic principles. 
Such an alteration should come-if it is to come at all-not as an accidental and 
hysterical outgrowth of war but as a conscious and deliberate choice of our 
people. Nor will such change be necessary to our survival even in a new "total 
war," says Miller, if we set about promptly to design flexible purchasing tech-
niques, to shape an intelligent fiscal policy, and to educate our industries prop-
erly. What is more, he blueprints a promising start toward at least the first 
of these goals. 
The core of the book is devoted to a study of the armed services' procurement 
techniques in the years prior to and during World War II and to an appraisal 
of the extent to which the lessons learned in World War I were put to use in 
improving these techniques. The story is not an inspiring one. For despite 
the fact that World War I demonstrated the total ineffectiveness of the tradi-
tional rigid competitive bidding system in time of emergency, little was done to 
substitute negotiation techniques for that system in the years of peace between 
the wars. Nor was anything done to correct such evils as inadequate inventory 
procedure, too-rigid specifications, over-estimation of needs, and unwieldy 
decentralization of procurement agencies. Instead, emphasis was placed almost 
entirely on ways and means of shackling future war profiteers. The chief les-
son apparently learned was that the cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contract 
widely used in World War I as a stop-gap substitute for competitive bidding 
was so open to abuse that it should be avoided at all costs. Similarly, the only 
work of the Nye Committee that gained the headlines was the evidence pro-
duced by it of profiteering, and its charges that the munitions-makers led us 
into war; the fact that its analysis of the War Department's procurement plans 
pointed up the need for complete overhauling of purchasing procedure was 
ignored. In fact, the author points out that "The practical result of the Nye 
investigation seems to have been to induce increasing timidity on the part of 
the services in their planning for industrial mobilizaton."2 Thus, when faced 
with World War II, the procurement departments of the armed services found 
1. P.223-4. 
2. P.44-5. 
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themselves again unequipped to use with maximum effect the free-enterprise 
techniques available. 
A detailed and well drawn picture is presented of the resulting procurement 
difficulties encountered in World Vvar II and of the attempts made to meet 
these difficulties. The various forms of contract documents (letters of intent; 
cost-plus-fixed-fee; fi.~ed-price; escalator; maximum-price; and target-price) 
are described, and their effectiveness in insuring the ma.~um flow of supplies 
with the minimum waste of our resources is evaluated. There is an interesting 
discussion of statutory renegotiation as a device for profit control, ending with 
the conclusion that it must be modified substantially and provide for liberal 
exemptions if it is not seriously to impair incentives to industrial efficiency. 
OPA's control over prices and WLB's control over salaries and wages, and the 
impact of these programs on the flow of goods to the military, including the 
controversy over whether price stabilization in the civilian goods area could 
be effective without similar stabilization of prices on military goods, are re-
viewed and appraised. In all of these studies, Miller is careful to give both 
sides of the story. Where free-enterprise clearly must be supplemented by 
direct controls, he concedes it. Nowhere does he attempt to prescribe a cure-
all. Frequently he admits that the figures available are insufficient to justify 
reliable judgments. But step by step he e.~nes what has been, points to 
obvious failures and suggests possible remedies. 
The concluding chapters contain a summary of the entire problem, a re-state-
ment of the principles and a ten-page list of 23 specific recommendations.3 
Much of this material is repetitious, but these chapters do have the advantage 
of giving to one who must read as he runs a neat capsule treatment of the 
entire problem and of possible ways to solve it. 
The book is not without faults. What book is? I should have liked a better 
job of organization. There is a good deal of point-belaboring and unnecessary 
summation which leads to the suspicion that too little time was spent in making 
a book out of the separate studies now titled as chapters. This makes for some 
impatient reading and a recurring feeling of "This is where I came in." Oc-
casionally, too, the author was apparently unable to resist the temptation to 
prove by the use of ponderous prose that he is, after all, a scholar. But such 
criticisms are quibbles in the light of the merit of the book as a whole. The fact 
that it might be a better book does not destroy the fact that it is now a very 
good book indeed, and the product of the sort of scholarship that we need 
more of. 
Above all else, it is clear that John Miller knows whereof he speaks. He has 
drawn not only on his own e.'>:perience but on that of a host of both business 
and military men with first-hand knowledge of the field. This combined 
knowledge and e.'\.1Jerience he has e.'-1Jertly synthesized to give help on a na-
tional problem of great urgency. The only disheartening thing about it is that 
the need for his book should be so immediate. 
ADDISON :M:UELLERT 
3. Pp. 24&-58. 
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